Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1970

Gordon Berlant v. John S. Mcallister, AdminisTrator of the Estates of Grant Kimball Mower and
Altha Mower, His Wife, Deceased : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsRaymond M. Berry; Attorney for RespondentArthur H. Nielsen,
David S. Cook and Udell R. Jensen, Don J. Hanson; Attorneys for Appellant's Liability Carrier
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Berlant v. Mcallister, No. 12076 (Utah Supreme Court, 1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/202

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON BERLANT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JOHN S. McALLISTER, Administrator of the Estates of Grant
Kimball Mower and Altha Mower,
his wife, deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.

12076

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from Judgment of the Seventh Judicial
District Court for Sanpete County,
Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, District Judge
RAYMOND M. BERRY
WORSLEY. SNOW & CHRISTENS.EN
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldsr.
Salt Lake Citv Utah 84101
Attornevs for Resnondent
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN.,,,. CONDER. HANSEN
AND H.l!iNRIOD
410 Newhouse Buildin2'
Sault Lake Citv. Utah 84111 and
dell R. Jensen
l25 North Main Street
Neohi. Utah 84648
Attorn~ys for Annellant
0onJ. Hanson
HANSON AND GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bld2.
Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84101
----·--------------------------------Attornevs for Annellant's Liabilitv Clo:k, Supremo Co:.::t, l:l.:h
Insurance Carrier

Davis Cook

FILED

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE __________________

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT------------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT 0 F FACTS ----------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF ELECTED TO AND
DID RATIFY THE SETTLEMENT MADE
BY FARMERS TO PROTECT HIM ________________

4

POINT II. THE PLAINTIFF'S RATIFICATION
OF FARMERS' SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE IS IRREVOCABLE --------------------------

8

POINT III. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND HIS REPLY ---------------------------------------- 11
POINT IV. THERE WAS AV ALID ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION ---------------------------------------- 13
CON CLUSI 0 N ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
CASES CITED

Austin vs. Stewart, 126 N.C. 525, 36 S.E. 2d 37 ----------------

9

Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity Building & Loan Association,
94 Utah 97, 75 P. 2d 669 (1938) -------------------------------- 13
Davis vs. Morgan, 228 N.C. 8, 44 S.E. 2d 593 (1947) ------

9

Goeltz vs. The Continental Bank & Trust Co., 5 Utah 2d
204, 299 p. 2d 832 ( 1956) -------------------------------------------- 11
Grandi vs. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399 P. 2d 285 (1965) ---- 10
Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. vs. Nephi Processing
Plant, Inc., 470 P. 2d 257 (Utah 1970) ---------------------- 12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page

Keith vs. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E. 2d 665 (1964) ____ 5 ,
Moses vs. Archie McFarland & Son, 119 Utah 602,
230 P. 2d 571 (1951) ---------------------------------------------------- 9
Norwood vs. Lassiter, 132 N.C. 52, 43 S.E. 2d 509 __________ 9
Summerhays

'VS.

Holm, 468 P. 2d 366 (Utah 1970) ________ 12

White vs. Perry, 7 N.C. App. 36, 171 S.E. 2d 56
( 19 69 ) ------------ -- ------------------------------------------------------------- _8, 9
AUTHORITIES CITED
Breckenridge, Rat'ification in North Carolina, 18 N.C.
L. Rev. 308 ______ ------------------------------ ____________ -------------------- 9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GORDON BERLANT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
JOHN S. McALLISTER, Administrator of the Estates of Grant
Kimball Mower and Altha Mower,
his wife, deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12076

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
In this action, arising from an automobile collision, the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant for personal injuries and the defendant seeks to
recover from the plaintiff for wrongful death of two
persons.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment in
his favor.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts is not accurate. The plaintiff filed the complaint prepared for
him by J. Rulon Morgan, an attorney, on November
7, 1968, nearly three years after the accident (R. 1).
A counterclaim in excess of the amount of the plaintiff's liability insurance and in the amount of
$103,000 was filed for wrongful death by the defendant on January 21, 1969 (R. 12). The counterclaim
was served on Gordon Berlant at his address in San
1\lateo, California, and was not served on Farmers
Insurance Exchange (R. 18). The plaintiff delivered the counterclaim to Farmers Insurance
Exchange (hereinafter called Farmers) and it employed Don J. Hanson, an attorney, to file a reply to
the counterclaim. To protect the plaintiff Mr. Hanson, in his reply to the counterclaim, pled as a defense
a compromise settlement including a release of all
claims signed by the defendant in April 1966 (R. 23,
24). The defense was not limited to the· extent the
counterclaim was covered by liability insurance issued by Farmers to the plaintiff.
After the settlement was pled as a reply to the
counterclaim the defendant moved for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint. This motion
was noticed up for hearing on February 12, 1969, (R.
25, 26) and later the hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment was continued until
April 10, 1969, in order to give the plaintiff, a non2
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resident, an opportunity to appear or to arrange for
legal counsel to appear on his behalf ( R. 36). At the
hearing on the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on April 10, 1969, Udell R. Jensen, as personal attorney for Mr. Berlant, appeared along with
Mr. Edward Garrett, an attorney employed by
Farmers to represent Mr. Berlant in the action. In
this hearing the settlement was relied upon as a defense to the counterclaim. In contradiction to what
appellant says in his brief the appellant relied on the
settlement and ratified it as a personal defense to
the counterclaim. During the hearing on April 10,
1969, Udell R. Jensen, the personal attorney for Mr.
Berlant, sought and received permission from the
court to file a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. The memorandum was filed by Udell R. Jensen, the personal attorney for Mr. Berlant, on May 29, 1969 (R. 49). In
this memorandum Udell R. Jensen ratified the release and claimed the release unequivocably as a defense. Mr. Jensen said:
"Upon the basis of the contents of the insurance policy, the contents of the court order,
and the contents of the release, plaintiff maintains the release is a bar to the counterclaim ;
that it may stand as such herein; and is not
an accord and satisfaction of the claim of the
plaintiff against the defe~dant. If the pl3;intiff must make any election after becoming
aware of his situation, he should not be required at this time to so do." (R. 51, 52).
On May 5, 1969, the court signed an order giv3
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ing Udell R. Jensen additional time to investigate
the facts and problems connected with the case (R.
53). On September 2, 1969, the lower court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (R. 71-73). After the lower
court signed an order on September 2, 1969, granting defendant's motion, Udell R. Jensen, on September 5, 1969, moved to vacate the September 2, 1969,
order and to file an amended reply to the counterclaim. September 5, 1969, was the first time the
plaintiff did not claim the compromise settlement,
including the release taken by Farmers, as a defense.
On March 12, 1970, the lower court granted surnn.iary judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and dismissed the action as to all parties with prejudice denying plaintiff the right to amend his reply (R. 92).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF ELECTED TO AND DID RATIFY
THE SETTLEMENT MADE BY FARMERS TO PROTECT HIM.

The plaintiff must accept the burdens that go
with the release obtained by Farmers as well as the
benefits the settlement provides.
In the lower court the defendant did not claim
the release constituted admission of negligence as a
matter of law on the part of the plaintiff. In
this court the defendant does not claim the release
constitutes an admission of negligence as a matter of
4
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(

law. In presenting Proposition A. under Point I appellant in his brief has presented to the court an immaterial issue.
The position of the defendant in the lower court
and in this court is that the compromise and settlement made by Farmers is a mutual settlement of all
claims between the plaintiff and the defendant because the plaintiff, after he learned of the settlement
and compromise made on his behalf by Farmers, ratified the settlement and compromise by claiming the
settlement, including the release taken by Farmers,
as a defense to defendant's counterclaim.
The evidence is clear that plaintiff elected to
and did ratify because:
1. He delivered the counterclaim to Farmers to

defend.

2. At the hearing on April 10, 1970, the plaintiff claimed the benefit of the settlement, including
the release.
3. Again on May 29, 1970, the plaintiff through
his personal attorney in submitting a memorandum
to the court, again claimed benefit of the settlement,
including the release.
The defendant concedes that if the plaintiff had
not elected to ratify and set up the release as a defense of the counterclaim, the release would not constitute a proper defense.
Keith vs. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E. 2d 665
5
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( 1964), is a leading case. In this case the plaintiff
brought an action to recover for personal injuries
and property damage. The defendant counterclaimed seeking to recover for personal injuries and
property damage sustained in the collision. The
plaintiff, in reply to the counterclaim, alleged his
liability insurer had paid defendant $1,250 in full
settlement of the defendant's claim against the plaintiff and that the defendant executed a release
barring defendant's counterclaim. The court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. The court
said where the plaintiff elected to plead the receipt of
$1,250 by the defendant and an execution of the release by the defendant for the compromise and settlement of the disputed claim, the settlement barred the
counterclaim and the plaintiff by pleading the release ratified the insurer's settlement and compromise and the parties each had to accept the burdens of the release as well as the benefits of settlement. In response to plaintiff's argument that sound
legal principles should not be applied in controversies
between insured motorists, the court said:
"Plaintiff argues this sound legal principle should not be applied in controversies
between insured motorists. He has, he says,
purchased and paid for insurance which will
compensate those he may injure. A payment
by his insurance carrier for injuries he inflicts
should not impair his right to compensation
for injuries he sustains. The contention would
have merit if his insurance provided for payment irrespective of fault or liability. It does
6
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not. It is liability, not accident insurance.
Plaintiff's insurance carrier was under no obligation to pay unless plaintiff was legally
liable. The insurance carrier had the right to
compromise and settle claims asserted against
.
d .... "
i•ts insure
The cases cited by appellant in his brief are not
in point. They involve factual situations in which it
is clear that the insured made no effort to ratify the
settlement or compromise made by his liability insurer.
In the cases cited by the appellant, in each instance the plaintiff did not have knowledge of the
settlement made by the insurer and did nothing to
E'how consent or ratification of the settlement.
In this case, Berlant, the plaintiff, claimed the
fruits of the settlement agreement after discovering
it. Mr. Berlant did not instruct Farmers to withdraw the release as a defense to the counterclaim.
He did not instruct Mr. Jensen to move to amend the
reply and vacate the release as a settlment. Instead,
Mr. Berlant, through his attorney, Mr. Jensen, and
through Farmers' attorney, relied on the release as
a defense to the counterclaim until they were notified summary judgment was being granted dismissing the action. Mr. Berlant consented to the settlement made by Farmers and ratified it by standing on
the release as a defense. Mr. Berlant is in the position of a principal trying to ratify a part of the
agreement and repudiate the rest. He cannot take
the rose without the thorns.
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF'S RATIFICATION OF FARMERS' SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE IS IRREVOCABLE.

Since the counterclaim was greatly in excess of
the plaintiff's liability insurance, it is understandecble that he wanted to rely on the fruits of the
compromise and settlement agreement. In this instance, Berlant, the plaintiff, did not act timely in
seeking to revoke the ratification. Instead, he waited
until the court ruled on the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and then sought to obtain leave
to amend his pleadings in order to withdraw the
settlement as a defense.
White vs. Perry, 7 N.C. App. 36, 171 S.E. 2d 56
( 1969), involved a factual situation similar to the
case of Mr. Berlant. In the White case the plaintiff
endeavored to withdraw a reply to avoid having it
constitute a ratification of plaintiff's liability insurer's settlement. In White vs. Perry, supra, an action
was brought by the plaintiff for personal injuries
and property damage and a counterclaim was asserted by the defendant. In reply to the counterclaim
the plaintiff asserted a release was obtained by his
liability insurer from the defendant. Thereafter, apparently to avoid ratification of his liability insurer's
settlement the plaintiff obtained an order from the
court and withdrew the reply setting up the release
as a defense. After an amended answer was filed
the defendant again pled the release to be a bar to
the plainiff's claim. The lower court granted judg8
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ment in favor of the defendant holding the release
to bar plaintiff's claim. On appeal the court of appeals said:
"This leaves us with the proposition of
whether the withdrawal by the plaintiff of the
further reply constituted a revocation of the
ratification. The answer is no. In Norwood
vs. Lassiter, 132 N.C. 52, 43 S.E. 2d 509, it is
said: 'When a party has the right to ratify or
reject, he is put thereby to his election, and he
must decide once and for all, what to do; and
when his election is once made it immediately
becomes irrevocable. This is an elementary
principle. Austin vs. Stewart, 126 N.C. 525,
36 S.E. 2d 37.' See also Breckenridge, Ratification in North Carolina, 18 N.C. L. Review
308. Although the further reply has been
withdrawn as a pleading, it was proper for
Judge Bundy to consider it in making his
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Davis
vs. Morgan, 228 N.C. 8, 44 S.E. 2d 593
(1947).
Utah requires a principal to accept the entire
contract negotiated by an agent and does not permit
the principal to accept that portion only that he
deems beneficial. In Moses vs. Archie McFarland &
Son, 119 Utah 602, 230 P. 2d 571 (1951), an agent
for Archie McFarland & Son purportedly, without
authority, entered into a contract to deliver 30,000
pounds of mutton at the rate of 3,000 pounds or more
per week as agreed to by the plaintiff. The defendant, after shipping approximately 6,625 pounds of a
30,000 pound order, tried to disaffirm its agent's order. In deciding the case in favor of the purchaser
9
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Moses this court said it was too late for Archie McFarland & Son to repudiate the agreement after
making the first shipment. Further the court said
that where an agent has entered into a contract without authority and purportedly on behalf of his principal, the principal cannot confirm such part of the
contract as is beneficial to him and reject the part
which is claimed to be detrimental.
If Berlant did not want to accept the detriment
of having the release obtained by Farmers bar his
claim against McAllister, he should not have claimed
the benefit of it to bar McAllister's counterclaim until the lower court ruled on McAllister's motion for
summary judgment. If the plaintiff, Berlant, did not
want to be bound by Farmer's agreement, he should
have repudiated the release agreement promptly and
should not have elected to stand on it until he knew
the court's ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In Grandi vs. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399
P. 2d 285 (1965), a horse trainer as an agent
employed by the seller registered a horse as a chestnut colt indicating it to be a stallion. In fact the horse
was a gelding and after the buyer clarned it upon the
official program showing it as a stallion the buyer
demanded his money back upon discovering immediately the misrepresentaton. In deciding the case the
court said that upon acquiring knowledge of an
agent's unauthorized act the principal should properly repudiate it or otherwise he will be presumed to
10
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have ratified it and affirmed it. This court also said
that when a principal expressly or impliedly elects to
ratify an unauthorized act he must so far as it is entire, ratify the whole of it, and he will not be permitted to accept its benefits and reject its burdens.
Ratification is equivalent to an original grant
of authority. Presumably, Berlant ratified the
settlement when he did not immediately repudiate
iL Clearly, between April 1969 and September 2,
1969, he did nothing to reject it.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS REPLY.

The lower court awarded summary judgment in
favor of the defendant dismissing the plaintiff's
cause of action on September 2, 1969. The plaintiff's
motion to amend the reply was not filed until September 5, 1969, or three days after the order was
entered dismissing the plaintiff's action. Farmers,
plainiff's insurer, paid only $5,150 for the deaths of
two persons. The plaintiff stood on the release obtained by Farmers as a defense to the counterclaim.
Udell R. Jensen, the personal attorney for Berlant,
told the lower court they should have the benefit of
the release. He did not repudiate it between April
1969, and September 2, 1969, the date the court
ruled.
In Goeltz vs. The Continental Bank & Trust
Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P. 2d 832 (1956), an action
11
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was brought against the bank to recover stock certificates delivered by the plaintiff to the bank. The
plaintiff's former husband had forged plaintiff's endorsement on the certificates as security for a loan.
During the trial the bank asked leave to amend its
answer and set up the defense of the statute of
limitations. The trial court refused to allow the
amendment. In this case, facts upon which the statute of limitations defense was based were known
to the bank prior to the bringing of the action. The
court said that under Rule 15 (a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that leave to amend
shall be freely given when justice requires, the bank
was not entitled to amend. The court said the bank
was willing to waive the defense of the statute of
limitations in the beginning and since the facts upon which the statute of limitations defense were
known from the start to the bank there was no abuse
of discretion in failing to permit the bank at trial to
amend and plead the statute of limitations.
In Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. vs. Nephi
Processing Plant, Inc. 470 P. 2d 257 (Utah 1970) a
defendant moved to file an amended answer to be
presented and this court held the amended answer
was properly refused, saying that the motion to
amend should have been pursued in advance of trial,
not at the trial.
In another case, Summerhays vs. Holm 468 P.
2d 366 (Utah 1970), this court stated a controvert12
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ing affidavit proffered at trial on a motion for summary judgment was not timely and without merit as
a defense.

POINT IV
THERE WAS A VALID ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

An accord and satisfaction is the giving of
money paid over in payment or extinguishment of a
claim. To constitute an accord and satisfaction there
must be a proper subject matter, competent parties
and the assent or meeting of the minds of parties and
a consideration. An accord is an agreement beween
parties, one to give or perform, the other to receive
or accept, such agreed payment or performance in
satisfaction of a claim and the satisfaction is a consummation of such agreement.
Farmers' payment to Mr. McAllister consumated an accord and satisfaction. Utah recognizes
this principle. In Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity Building
& Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P. 2d 669
( 1938), this court said that where the parties are in
disagreement and, in good faith, thereafter reach
a compromise settlement of the unliquidated and disputed claim, the settlement constitutes an accord
and satisfaction.

The settlement between Farmers and the defendant McAllister in April, 1966, constituted an
accord and satisfaction. The plaintiff, when he
adopted the benefits of the settlement as a defense
to the counterclaim ratified the accord and satisfac13
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tion and was bound by the detriments in it as well as
the benefits it gave him. The plaintiff takes the accord and satisfaction in its entirety, the thorns go
with the rose.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment in favor of the defendant should be affirmed because:
1. There is a valid accord and satisfaction.

2. The plaintiff elected to and did ratify the
compromise and settlement made by Farmers.
3. The plaintiff did not repudiate or reject the
compromise settlement timely after discovering it.
4. The lower court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to permit the plaintiff to amend his re·
ply to revoke the ratification after making its ruling.

Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
'VORSLEY, SNO'V &
CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify by United States Mail, postage
prepaid, I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief
to Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & Henriod 410 Newhouse
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, two copies to
Udell R. Jensen, 125 North Main Street, Nephi,
Utah 84648, and two copies to Hanson and Garrett,
520 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101 this ____________________ day of ____________________________ ,
1970.

Raymond M. Berry
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